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EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS AND THE PROPOSED CONSTITUTIONAL
AMENDMENTS TO THE TREATY PoWER-The advent of the present
administration has brought into full bloom a hardy perennial among
the annual crop of proposed constitutional amendments. The emergence of the United States from World War II as the leader of the free
nations of the world and distrust of the rapid expansion of executive
power under the Roosevelt Administration have given impetus to a
movement to check any further expansion of the presidential power to
conduct our foreign relations. In addition, many people are alarmed by
the possibility that this country might become a party to international
agreements which would operate to alter or destroy rights guaranteed
to our citizens by the Constitution. The result has been the re-introduction in the Senate this year of two proposals to amend the Constitution in order to limit the power of the executive in making treaties and
executive agreements. One of these is the Bricker amendment, sponsored by Senator Bricker of Ohio and some sixty-three other Senators.1
The other is the briefer but more drastic proposal authored by the Amer1 S.J. Res. 1, 83d Cong., 1st sess. (1953), S.J. Res. 130 as amended, 82d Cong., 2d sess.
(1952):
"Section I. A provision of a treaty which denies or abridges any right enumerated in
this Constitution shall not be of any force or effect.
"Section 2. No treaty shall authorize or permit any foreign power or any international
organization to supervise, control, or adjudicate rights of citizens of the United States
within the United States enumerated in this Constitution or any other matter essentially
within the domestic jurisdiction of the United States.
"Section 3. A treaty shall become effective as internal law in the United States only
through the enactment of appropriate legislation by the Congress.
"Section 4. All executive or other agreements between the President and any international organization, foreign power, or official thereof shall be made only in the manner
and to the extent to be prescribed by law. Such agreements shall be subject to the limitations imposed on treaties, or the making of treaties, by this article."
Sections 5 and 6 contain an enabling clause and a ratification clause, respectively.
S.J. Res. I was amended in the Senate Committee on the Judiciary and, as amended,
reported out on June 15, 1953. As reported, the provisions of the measure are substantially
identical to the provisions contained in §1 of S.J. Res. 43, quoted infra note 2.
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ican Bar Association.2 Both of these amendments, if adopted, would
effect a substantial change in the present power to make treaties and
executive agreements and would shift the balance of power in the
conduct of foreign relations from the executive to the legislative branch
of government. It is proposed in this comment to discuss only the effect
of the amendments on agreements other than treaties, but inasmuch as
both amendments provide that executive agreements shall be subject to
the same limitations as are imposed on treaties,3 it is necessary before
focusing on the executive agreement aspect of the amendments to give
some consideration to their effect on the executive's foreign relations
power as a whole. 4
The Constitution places all power to conduct our affairs with other
nations in one agency, the federal government.5 The foreign relations
power is not spelled out in any one clause of the Constitution, but most
of the relevant clauses are found in Article II, and place primary responsibility for this task upon the President. He is the Executive6 and the
Commander-in-Chief of the army and navy. 7 He is given the power to
make treaties by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.8 He is
given the power to appoint and to receive ambassadors and other ministers. 0 Accordingly, it is his responsibility to manage the daily conduct
of our foreign affairs, for he is "the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international relations."10
Both directly and indirectly Congress also plays an important role
in international affairs. Although all direct negotiations with foreign
governments are conducted solely by the President,11 the Constitution
requires the concurrence of two-thirds of the Senators present before
2 S.J. Res. 43, 83d Cong., 1st sess. (1953):
"Section 1. A provision of a treaty which conHicts with any provision of this Constitution shall not be of any force or effect. A treaty shall become effective as internal law
in the United States only through legislation which would be valid in the absence of treaty.
Executive agreements shall be subject to regulation by the Congress and to the limitations
imposed on treaties by this article."
Sections 2 and 3 contain an enabling clause and a ratification clause, respectively.
3 Id., §1, third sentence, and §4 of S.J. Res. 1, supra note 1.
4 See generally, Bishop, "Structure of Federal Power over Foreign Affairs," 36 MINN.
L. R:sv. 299 (1952).
5 The states have no power to engage in international relations. U.S. CoNST., art. I,
§10.
s Id., art. II, §1, cl. 1.
7Id., art. II, §2, cl. 1.
s Id., art. II, §2, cl. 2.
o Id., art. II, §2, cl. 2, and §3.
10 United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 57 S.Ct. 216 (1936).
11 McDougal and I.ans, ''Treaties and Congressional-Executive or Presidential Agreements: Interchangeable Instruments of National Policy: I," 54 YALE L.J. 181 at 203 (1945).
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a treaty can be made. 12 In addition to senatorial participation in the
making of treaties, however, Congress as a whole is given a: number
of very effective indirect controls over our foreign policy. It has the
power to legislate in many areas which, while primarily of domestic
concern, nevertheless may be of substantial importance internationally.
Among the foremost of these is the congressional power over the purse.
The House of Representatives has always insisted on its right to discuss
the merits·of a treaty before voting on any appropriations which may
be necessary to carry it into effect.13 Indeed, it requires little imagination to see the international complications that may arise in respect to
almost every grant of legislative power in Article I, section 8, of the
Constitution. Furthermore, in the celebrated case of Missouri v.
Holland,1 4 it was held that Congress has the power through the "necessary and proper" clause15 to enact legislation for the purpose of
effectuating treaties even though, in the absence of a treaty, it would
have no delegated power over the subject matter of the legislation. The
so-called "which" clause of the American Bar Association amendment:1 6
is designed to nullify the rule of Missouri v. Holland. This, of course,
is an effort to preserve states rights from being whittled away by means
of the treaty power. Its effect is to leave an area in which, as a practical
matter, the United States can have no international dealings which
would have internal effects.1 7 In order to make an international agreement providing for reciprocal internal legislation of a nature which
under our Constitution could not be passed by Congress in the absence
of a treaty, it would be necessary to persuade the legislatures of all
forty-eight states to enact the contemplated legislation-a rather difficult
undertaking for any Secretary of State.
Aside from the "which" clause of the AB.A. amendment and section
2 of the Bricker amendment, which limits the scope of certain types
of treaties with or without congressional approval, the amendments
contain essentially the same provisions. They both start with a general
12 U.S. CoNST., art. II, §2, cl. 2.
13 This has been the practice since the Jay Treaty in 1795. See McDougal and Lans,
in 54 YALE L.J. 181 at 240 (1945), supra note 11.
14 252 U.S. 416, 40 S.Ct. 382 (1920).
15 U.S. CoNST., art. I, §8, cl. 18.
16 " ••• which would be valid in the absence of treaty." See note 2 supra.
1 7 "This would create a No-Man's Land in foreign affairs. It would require the concurrence of all 48 States to make effective such common treaties as treaties of Friendship,
Commerce, and Navigation, e.'Ctradition, reciprocal inheritance taxation, migratory birds,
collection of foreign debts, and status of foreign troops. In this field of foreign affairs our
country would not speak with one voice but with 49." Statement by the Secretary of State
Before the Senate Judiciary Committee 7 (April 6, 1953), Dept. of State Press Release 174
of April 6, 1953.
·
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prohibition against any treaty which conflicts with the Constitution
or abridges any rights enumerated in it.18 There seems little doubt
but that this is the law as it stands today without such a provision,19 so
there is no serious objection to it except that it is unnecessary. Both
amendments would also eliminate the possibility of having selfexecuting treaties, for they provide that "A treaty shall become effective
as ·internal law in the United States only through the enactment of
appropriate legislation by the Congress."20 Under the supremacy clause '
of Article VI of the Constitution, treaties are the supreme law of the
land and binding upon our courts. Some treaties are not intended to
have any effect on the internal law of the contracting nations until
appropriate legislation is enacted for that purpose. These are styled
"non-self-executing" treaties. Others are intended to have immediate
effect domestically as well as internationally and in this country would
become the law of the land as soon as they were ratified. While it is
not always easy to tell from the treaty whether it is intended to be selfexecuting or not, the amendment, to say the least, is a drastic way of
making certain. Moreover, as has often been pointed out, if it is
desirable to have congressional surveillance over treaties, that power
is already available under the Constitution and has been used, for
there is a substantial body of case law to the effect that wherever a treaty
conflicts with an act of Congress, the one which is later in time prevails.21 Thus Congress may abrogate the internal effect of any treaty
merely by enacting legislation so providing. The proposed elimination
of self-executing treaties might secure additional congressional control
over foreign relations, but only at the expense of a great deal of inconvenience and delay, both because of the time it would take to get the
necessary legislation through Congress and because of the distrust other
nations might have of the ability of our executive to secure the appro18 S.J. Res.

1, §1, supra note 1. Cf. S.J. Res. 43, §1, supra note 2.
The Supreme Court has never declared a treaty unconstitutional. Dicta to the effect
that treaties may not conHict with the Constitution are plentiful, however. Geofroy v. Riggs,
133 U.S. 258 at 267, 10 S.Ct. 295 (1890); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 at 277, 21
S.Ct. 770 (1901); Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 at 433, 40 S.Ct. 382 (1920); United
States v. Minnesota, 270 U.S. 181 at 207, 46 S.Ct. 298 (1926); Burnet v. Brooks, 288 U.S.
378 at 400, 53 S.Ct. 457 (1933). See also Chafee, "Federal and State Powers under the
U.N. Covenant on Human Rights," 1951 Wxs. L. REv. 389 at 433-453; 3 SYRACUSE L.
REv. 315 (1952).
20 S.J. Res. 1, §3, supra note 1, is quoted. Cf. S.J. Res. 43, supra note 2.
21 The leading cases are Alvarez y Sanchez v. United States, 216 U.S. 167, 30 S.Ct.
361 (1910); The Chinese Exclusion Cases, Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S.
581, 9 S.Ct. 623 (1889); and The Head Money Cases, Edye v. Robertson, 112 U.S. 580,
5 S.Ct. 247 (1884).
19
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priate congressional action. 22 At no time in our history has it been so
necessary that we be able to move surely and swiftly in conducting our
foreign affairs. The risk of harm from overly rigid constitutional provisions may be far greater than the risk of harm from any possible abuse
of the foreign relations power which the proposed amendments might
eliminate. 23 Yet if rigid provisions are inconvenient in the making of
treaties, they are doubly so with respect to international agreements
other than treaties. To appraise the effect of the amendments on the
executive agreement aspect of our foreign relations, it is necessary to
attempt some characterization of the executive agreement under the
present constitutional provisions.

I. Executive Agreements
The Constitution provides that the President shall have power by
and with the advice and consent of the Senate to make treaties with
other governments. This has never been interpreted to mean that a
treaty is the only kind of agreement the United States may make with
a foreign power. It is only a permissive grant, for it does not preclude
the making of agreements which are not treaties, but which are equally
binding in international law.24 These agreements other than treaties
·are usually called executive agreements because their chief, but by no
means exclusive, use is in the daily conduct of foreign affairs by the
executive branch of government. Such agreements have been used
from the earliest days of our government but, as has frequently been
pointed out, their use has increased greatly as our country has grown
in importance internationally.
"During the first fifty years of government under the Constitution
the President is known to have entered into some 27 international
acts without invoking the consent of the Senate, while 60 became
law as treaties; for the second half-century the figures appear to
be 238 executive agreements and 215 treaties; and for the third
similar period 917 executive agreements and 524 treaties." 25

In· an annex to the statement of Secretary of State Dulles before the
Senate Judiciary Committee in its hearings on the proposed constitutional amendments, it is said that since 1928 there have been listed in
22 Statement of the Department of State before the Senate Judiciary Committee, an•
nexed to Dept. of State Press Release 174 of April 6, 1953, p. 9.
23 Statement of the Secretary of State before the Senate Judiciary Committee, supra
note 17 at p. 7.
24 5 HACKWORTH, lNTilRNATIONAL LAW 397 (1943).
25 McCLtrnE, EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS 4 (1941).
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State Department publications some 1527 executive agreements compared to 299 treaties. 26 These figures have frequently been cited as
evidence that we are abandoning the method which the Constitution
provides for handling international relations. The figures are very
misleading, however, unless some analysis is made of the subject matter
of the agreements. While it is not true that the executive agreement
has been and can only be used for relatively minor matters of international concern, it is clear that the great bulk of the daily work of the
State Department is conducted through executive agreements. Every
exchange of notes with a foreign government which results in an understanding would be an executive agreement under a strict construction of
the proposed amendments, but while executive agreements may be
loosely defined as any international agreements other than treaties, the
term usually refers to a transaction of a somewhat formal nature. 27
The point where ordinary correspondence stops and executive agreements begin is a difficult one to fix. The term executive agreement
itself is misleading in that it does not suggest the important part which
Congress plays in the making of most of the more important ones.
There are really three types of executive agreements: (I) agreements
entered into under prior authorization of Congress; (2) agreements
entered into by the President alone but subsequently sanctioned or
implemented by Congress; and (3) agreements entered into by the
President alone under his own constitutional powers. 28 Although no
executive agreement has ever been held unconstitutional, there is much
disagreement as to the constitutional limitations on the use of this power
by the executive.29
The basis of the President's power to make agreements with other
nations is said to stem from three sources, his power as executive, as
Commander-in-Chief, and as the sole diplomatic representative of the
United States.30 It must be pointed out at the beginning that the
26 Statement of the Department of State, supra note 22, Annex D at p. 16. The publications referred to are the Executive Agreement Series (E.A.S.), Treaty Series (T.S.), and
the Treaties and Other International Acts Series (T.I.A.S.).
2 7 Moore, "Treaties and Executive Agreements," 20 PoL. Ser. Q. 385 at 389 (1905).
28 Statement of the Department of State, supra note 22, Annex D at 3; McDougal and
Lans, in 54 YALE L.J. 181 at 204, 205 (1945), supra note 11. Perlman, "On Amending
the Treaty Power," 52 CoL. L. REv. 825 (1952).
29 See McDougal and Lans, in 54 YALE L.J. 181 (1945), supra note 11, and Borchard,
"Treaties and Executive Agreements-A Reply," 54 YALE L.J. 616 (1945), for 300 pages
of pitched professorial battle. See also Fraser, ''Treaties and Executive Agreements," S.
Doc. No. 244, 78th Cong., 2d sess. (1944), a rather restrictive view of the power to make
executive agreements.
30 McDougal and Lans, in 54 YALE L.J. 181 at 245 (1945), supra note 11. Not all
writers would agree with the inclusion of executive powers as such. See Borchard, in 45
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President as sole diplomatic representative of the United States has the
power to bind this country under international law in matters over
which he has no constitutional authority. 31 It is the position of most
nations, including this one,32 that when the diplomatic representative
gives assurances of the validity of his action, the foreign nation is
entitled to rely on that and may consider the agreement binding. It is
of no concern to the foreign nation what domestic processes the executive must go through in order to legalize the agreement under his own
constitution. It is sometimes suggested that because as a matter of
international law the executive has the power to bind his government,
the right to make such agreements is inherent in our President's power
as executive.33 This is a dangerous assumption to make, for it does not
necessarily follow from the fact that the President has the power to
bind us internationally that it is not unconstitutional for him to do so.
It is true, however, that there are a number of executive agreements
which have been upheld by the Supreme Court that cannot be attributed either to the President's power as Commander-in-Chief or as
the sole diplomatic representative of the United States,34 and which
therefore must either have been made under an inherent executive
power or through some delegation of power by Congress. Attempts
have been made to justify certain types of executive agreements on the
theory of congressional delegation of power because perhaps the largest
and most important group of these agreements arises from acts of Congress requesting that agreements be made with foreign powers and/or
providing legislation which is to take effect when, as, and if such agreements are made by the President.35 The argument is made that since
it is generally agreed that all of the power over international affairs is
located in the national government, it must be given either to Congress
YALl! L.J. 616 at 618 (1945), supra note 29. Fraser, "Treaties and Executive Agreements,"
S. Doc. No. 244, 78th Cong., 2d sess., 15, 16 (1944).
31 The
LAW

Claim of the United States and Venezuela Co., 5
156 (1943).

32Ibid.
33 This

HACKWORTH, lNr:sRNATIONAL

notion stems from the broad qbiter of Justice Sutherland in United States v.
Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 at 318, 57 S.Ct. 216 (1936), " ••• the investment of the federal government with the powers of external sovereignty did not depend upon
the affirmative grants of the Constitution."
34 Some examples cited in Fraser, "Treaties and Executive Agreements," S. Doc. No.
244, 78th Cong., 2d sess. (1944), include quarantine inspection, load line certificates, issuance of licenses to pilots, civil aircraft, waiver of visa fees, debt funding, exchange of information on narcotics, trade marks, and copyrights.
35 For a statistical compilation of these agreements according to number and subject
matter see Statement of the Department of State, supra note 22, Annex D at 5-12. Of 1527
executive agreements made in the past 25 years, 1139 fall into this category.
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or to the President.36 Any powers which are not given to the President
must have been left in Congress. When, therefore, Congress enacts
such a statute, it "authorizes" the President to make the agreement.
How Congress, which has no power of its own to make an international
agreement, can authorize the President to make one is not entirely clear.
It has been suggested that the power to make an executive agreement
may be separated into several powers, and while the President undoubtedly has the power to conduct all negotiations with a foreign
government and to conclude the agreement, Congress has the power
to determine foreign policy and to authorize the President to make
agreements pursuant to its determination of the proper policy.37 Assuming that Congress has this power to authorize the President to make
agreements, it should be an unlawful act for the President to make
such an agreement without prior authorization unless the agreement
was within his own exclusive powers. Even though Congress could
make the agreement binding internally as the law of the land by a
subsequent ratification, that would not make the presidential action any
more lawful in the first instance. Yet if this practice is unconstitutional
it is surprising that there has not been more furor in its recent use in
agreements regarding our participation in various United Nations and
other international agreements.38
A closer examination of the nature of this power of Congress to
authorize presidential agreements only increases the doubts as to its
existence. There is, of course, no question but that Congress exercises
such a power politically. If Congress indicates its desire that the President make a certain agreement and enacts legislation which is to take
effect when he does, it will often be politically inexpedient for the
President to refuse to negotiate the agreement. Likewise, if the President makes an agreement, it is within the power of Congress to frustrate
it completely either by refusing to enact any necessary implementing
legislation in the nature of appropriations or otherwise, or by enacting
legislation inconsistent with the agreement. In the latter case there
seems little doubt but that the act of Con,gress would prevail over the
36 ''What is completely certain is that the powers of Congress can be superadded to those
of the President, and that the two sets of powers taken together are plenary." McDougal
and Lans, in 54 YALE L.J. 181 at 246 (1945), supra note I I.
s1 Id. at 202, 203.
38 Statement of the Department of State, supra note 22, Annex D at 12, 13, lists nine
such approvals since 1944. The furor has not been over the method of joining the organizations but over the possibility that we might become a party to future international agreements which the organizations are considering.
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agreement.39 Although it does not follow from the existence of Congress's indirect methods of control over foreign affairs that whenever
Congress gives the President a political go-ahead by "authorizing" the
making of an agreement it also confers upon him the constitutional
right to do so, it is inescapable that such agreements have been upheld. 40
Even if it is accepted, however, that Congress may authorize the President to make agreements and that the President and Congress together
have plenary power in foreign affairs, that does not mean that Congress
can authorize the President to make any agreement which he cannot
make under his own powers. For example, as has already been pointed
out, a treaty operating through the "necessary and proper" clause will
permit Congress to enact legislation over which it would otherwise
have no delegated power. 41 While not all would agree, 42 this is probably also true in some cases of an executive agreement, for the "necessary
and proper" clause gives Congress the power "To make all Laws which
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution . . . Powers
vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States,
or in any Department or Officer thereof."43 It is to be noted that it
would be a condition precedent to this sort of action that the President
have the power under the Constitution to make the agreement in
question. It would be reasoning in a tight little circle indeed to say
that the President got this power through congressional authorization
of the agreement. Congress's power to authorize agreements must,
therefore, be limited to situations in which it could act under its delegated legislative powers. Thus even under the view that Congress can
authorize executive agreements there will be instances in which the
subject matter is not within a power delegated to Congress, nor within
the President's own power as Commander-in-Chief or as diplomatic
representative. Such a situation has never come before the courts. It
would squarely present the problem of whether or not the executive
has· an inherent power to make agreements which are either to operate
in the fashion of a self-executing treaty or to serve as the basis for congressonal action as in Missouri v. Holland, for it could be upheld only
on that theory. If the President has no such inherent power, then this
sort of agreement can be made only by treaty.
39 Even if the agreement is accorded the status of a treaty this would be so. See note
21 supra.
40 See note 34 supra.
41Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 40 S.Ct. 382 (1920).
42 Borchard, in 54 YALE L.J. 616 at 632-636 (1945), supra note 29.
43 U.S. CoNsT., art. I, §8, cl. 18.
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Closely related to the problem of the exact constitutional basis of
the various types of executive agreements which have been made by
this country is the question of the extent to which the executive agreement is interchangeable with the treaty as an instrument of foreign
policy. Assertions that the two are completely interchangeable44 and
that in fact the executive agreement is the more preferable of the two
because it avoids minority control by one third of the Senate and permits the more "democratic" process of authorization by a simple majority of both Houses of Congress45 have no doubt played their part in
creating the present fear of the treaty power. In terms of international
law whether we choose to submit an agreement to the Senate for
approval and call it a treaty has little effect upon the binding nature
of the agreement. That is determined in general by the subject matter
of the agreement and the contemplations of the contracting parties.
An executive agreement may be intended to be just as permanent as
many treaties. 46 In terms of the domestic effect of the agreement upon
the United States, however, there may be a substantial difference. As
has been noted, a treaty is the supreme law of the land and has been
placed by the Supreme Court on a par with an act of Congress. In
addition, it is clear under Missouri v. Holland that it can have the
effect of authorizing congressional action otherwise impossible.
Whether the same is true of the executive agreement is a matter of
much speculation. There are very few decisions discussing the question of whether an executive agreement is a treaty within the meaning
of the supremacy clause of the Constitution. It is apparent, of course,
that it would be difficult to get a clear decision in any case where the
agreement was authorized or ratified by act of Congress because the
act of Congress would be the law of the land in its own right. In that
situation the question would probably arise only if Congress had delegated too much power to the President and the agreement had to stand
or fall on the basis of the executive's own authority. 47 Accordingly we
have only a few decisions dealing with the executive agreements made
by the President solely on his own authority. The most notable of
these are the decisions of the Supreme Court in United States v.
44 This is the thesis of McDougal and Lans, in 54 YALB L.J. 181 (1945), supra note
11, and of McCLURE, Ex:Ecunv.n AGREEMENTS (1941).
45McDougal and Lans, in 54 YALB L.J. 181, 534 at 535 (1945), supra note 11.
46 Perlman, "On Amending the Treaty Power," 52 CoL. L. REv. 825 at 863 (1952).
47 Cf. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 57 S.Ct. 216
(1936), which involved not an executive agreement, but an executive order embargoing arms
shipments issued pursuant to authority delegated by Congress.
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Belmont48 and United States v. Pink49 dealing with the validity and
effect of the Litvinov Assignment.
The Litvinov Agreement was an assignment of certain Russian
claims against American nationals including corporations and other
business associations which was made in connection with diplomatic
recognition of the Soviet Union by the United States.50 The Belmont
case was an action brought by the United States in a federal district
court to recover one of the claims assigned. The Supreme Court held
that an executive agreement made by the President alone under his
exclusive power to grant diplomatic recognition to foreign states was
valid without the assent of the Senate.51 The court said that the external powers of the United States were to be exercised without regard
for state laws or policies.52 It was not until the Pink case, however,
that there was a clear and unequivocal holding that the state policy must
yield to the federal policy as announced in the executive agreement. In
that case the New York Court of Appeals had held that the law of the
situs governed the ownership of the property and that under New York
law the Russian nationalization decrees had not been effective to alter
property rights in New York and that therefore the United States had
received no title through the assignment. The Supreme Court held
that our national policy, which they inferred from the agreement, was
to recognize the validity of the Russian nationalization decrees and that
national policy in the field of foreign affairs overrode any state policies
to the contrary. 53 The court did not have to decide that an executive
agreement was, like a treaty, the law of the land for all purposes, but
the dicta in both the Pink and Belmont cases were fully that broad.54
We have no decision holding that an executive agreement takes precedence over a state statute. Any generalizations as to whether executive
agreements can override either state or federal statutes is at best a matter
U.S. 324, 57 S.Ct. 758 (1937).
U.S. 203, 62 S.Ct. 552 (1942).
the series of notes culminating on November 16, 1933 in the Litvinov Assignment, see 1933 DocuMENTs ON hrrERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 460-472 (1934).
51 United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 at 330, 57 S.Ct. 758 (1937).
52 Id. at 331.
53 United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 at 231, 62 S.Ct. 552 (1942).
54 "A treaty is a 'Law of the Land' under the supremacy clause (Art. VI, cl. 2) of the
Constitution. Such international compacts and agreements as the Litvinov Assignment have
a similar dignity.'' Id. at 230. "Plainly the external powers of the United States are to be
exercised without regard to state laws or policies. • • • And while this rule in respect to
treaties is established by the express language of cl. 2, Art. VI, of the Constitution, the same
rule would result in the case of all international compacts. and agreements from the very fact
that complete power over international affairs is in the national government and is not and
cannot be subject to curtailment or interference on the part of the several states." United
States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 at 331, 57 S.Ct. 758 (1937).
48 301
49 315
50 For
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of speculation because of the limited number of decisions in this field.
Most writers seem to agree, however, that an executive agreement will
not prevail over a conflicting federal statute.55 If a subsequent statute
is involved, the rule whereby a subsequent act of Congress prevails
over a treaty would govern. Where, however, the conflict is between an
agreement and a prior act of Congress, if the agreement must yield, it
cannot be said that executive agreements are the equivalent of treaties
for all purposes because a treaty would prevail over a prior act of Congress.56 A recent case in the Court of Claims seems to have taken the
plunge and held that an executive agreement is the law of the land and
will prevail even over a federal statute.57 The court was there concerned
with the Byrnes-Blum Agreement under which all claims against the
United States arising from the Moroccan campaign were to be submitted to a French commission and paid by the French Government.
Plaintiff submitted his claim but rejected the award which was made
and brought an action in the Court of Claims. The court in dismissing
his petition said:
"The Byrnes-Blum Agreement between the United States and
France is the type of agreement which has been recognized as a
treaty within the meaning of Article VI, Clause 2, of the Constitution and thus is a part of the 'supreme Law of the Land.'
[citing the Pink and Belmont cases] ... This court has recently
had occasion to consider the effect of treaties and international
agreements upon the consent of the United States to be sued in
the case of Hannevigv. United States, 84 F. Supp. 743, ll4 Ct.Cl.
410...."58
In the Hannevig case the court had held that a treaty providing for the
settlement of the claim had the effect of withdrawing the claim from
the court's jurisdiction "as effectually as if this had been accomplished
by a statute enacted by both Houses of Congress and approved by the
President."59 The court clearly implies that the agreement was just as
effective to divest the court of its statutory jurisdiction as a treaty would
be, but their concluding statement to the effect that the plaintiff's
submission of the claim to the French commission was an election of
remedies considerably weakens the decision.
There is no question but that the executive agreement has become
55 Borchard, in 54 YALB L.J. 616 at 643, 644 (1945), supra note 29; McDougal and

Lans, id., 181 at 317, supra note 11.
56 Supra note 21.
57Etlimar Societe Anonyme v. United States, (Ct. Cl. 1952) 106 F. Supp. 191.
58 Id. at 195, 196.
59 Hannevig v. United States, (Ct. Cl. 1949) 84 F. Supp. 743 at 744.
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an extremely important instrument in the conduct of our foreign
relations. Our present preeminence in world affairs promises to make
it even more important. Yet no one has been able to give an exact
exposition of its constitutional nature. Nor can anyone say with certainty what things the President or the President and Congress together
may do with an executive agreement and what things they may not do.
Supreme Court decisions on the question are rare, largely because of
procedural difficulties in raising the constitutional issue. 60 That there
should be as yet no precise or even general limitations on the exercise of
such an important power is remarkable in a constitutional system which
professes limitation of powers as its keystone. It is hardly surprising,
therefore, that the present pressure for a constitutional amendment
placing limitations on the executive agreement should exist. Nevertheless, the absence of judicial limitations to date gives some testimony of
the difficulty in imposing any limitations on the power to make these
agreements which would still preserve enough freedom for the executive
to be able to conduct our foreign relations in a manner commensurate
with our internal and international responsibilities. Accordingly, any
proposals to limit this power by constitutional amendment must be carefully considered to determine whether they do in fact achieve the limitations desired and at what cost in loss of ability to conduct our foreign
affairs they are achieved.

II. The Proposed Constitutional Amendments
Both the Bricker and AB.A. amendments provide for congressional
regulation of executive agreements and subject them to the same limitations as are imposed on treaties. 61 Of the latter limitations the prohibition against self-executing agreements is the most important. By giving
to Congress the power to regulate the manner and extent to which
executive agreements may be made, they transfer from the President
to Congress a large measure of the ultimate responsibility for the conduct of our foreign relations. This has been criticized as a violation
of the doctrine of separation of powers, and the charge contains some
measure of truth. For while the doctrine of separation of powers is
still maintained, the amendments do draw a new line of separation. The
wisdom of this depends upon whether there is a present imbalance
60 Constitutional guarantees may not cover persons or property outside the United
States though they may be affected by agreements. Cf. In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453, 11 S.Ct.
897 (1891); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 at 332, 57 S.Ct. 758 (1937). Agreements having an internal effect such as the Litvinov Assignment are rare.
61 S.J. Res. 1, §4, supra note 1, and S.J. Res. 43, §1, supra note 2.
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between presidential and congressional powers in this area and upon
whether the amendments achieve such checks on presidential power
as are necessary. As to the former, no answer will be essayed, but as to
the latter some observations must be made.
It is quite clear that adoption of the amendments, thereby giving
Congress the power to prescribe limitations on the making of executive
agreements, will in no way affect the need of this country to have broad
areas of power in which the President may make international agreements. It must be assumed that the sponsors of the amendments contemplate that Congress will meet this necessity with rather broad
enabling acts giving the President these powers. Otherwise the effect
would be to cripple us dangerously in the field of foreign affairs at a
time when the world requires a United States that can move swiftly
and decisively in its dealings with other nations. If the result which
the amendments wish to achieve is to prevent presidential abuse of
power and at the same time to give to the President enough power to
permit him to carry out his executive duties, then the task placed upon
Congress is one which has thus far proved impossible. Much of the
pressure for these amendments arises from public dissatisfaction with
agreements such as Yalta and Potsdam, yet try to phrase an enabling
act which would permit the President to make the agreements with
allies and co-belligerents necessary in the successful conduct of a war
and which would still prevent the making of a Yalta or a Potsdam
agreement. The question of what is and what is not the proper subject
matter for an executive agreement has not yet been answered, nor can
it be. Senator Bricker himself has admitted that he cannot draw the
line. 62 Secretary of State Dulles told the Senate Judiciary Committee
that he had tried to draft an amendment which would eliminate the
risk of abuse of power without incurring risks far greater but found
it impossible to do so. 63 The plain fact of the matter is that Congress
cannot grant the President power to make those agreements which are
necessary without incurring the risk of agreements which might prove
undesirable, unless Congress undertakes to make a separate evaluation
of each agreement which is proposed. It goes without saying that in
the areas where executive agreements are most necessary, the need for
speed and sometimes secrecy will be essential, and the requirement of
independent congressional analysis of each agreement would be ruinous.
It seems probable, if not certain, that transferring to Congress the job
62 98 CoNG.

REc. 923 (Feb. 7, 1952).
Statement of the Secretary of State before the Senate Judiciary Committee, supra
note 17, at 3.
63
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of regulating executive agreements cannot achieve the desired check
on the occasional presidential abuse of power unless it does so at the
expense of damaging restrictions on the President's power to conduct
the daily business of his office.
Both amendments require that an executive agreement become
effective as internal law only through appropriate legislation by Congress. 64 Secretary Dulles has suggested that under our present constitutional provisions an executive agreement cannot become the law.
of the land without congressional action, 65 but the Pink case and the
dicta in other decisions cast some doubt upon his assertion. 66 . Where
Congress has authorized or implemented an agreement, the act of Congress would be the law of the land in its own right. A treaty, which
is also the law of the land, requires the assent of two thirds of the
Senate. In both cases our legislative branch or a part of it has the
power to determine what shall be the law of the land. If the Pink
case means that an agreement made by the President alone is the law
of the land, then it is the only case where the President has of his own
right the power to make laws for the country. Making law is a legislative function. It is submitted that while the elimination of selfexecuting treaties is probably · unwarranted, the elimination of selfexecuting executive agreements having an internal effect on the laws
of this country would be desirable. It is quite possible that the Supreme
Court may yet decide that executive agreements in themselves are not
the law of the land, but if that does not happen, a constitutional amendment so providing would be worthy of support. If the President makes
an executive agreement under his own powers as Commander-in-Chief
or as diplomatic representative, then Congress should and does have the
power to enact any necessary internal legislation under the "necessary
and proper'? clause in the same manner as was sustained by the Supreme
Court in Missouri v. Holland in the case of a treaty. 67 The President
may make the agreement, but Congress ought to give it any internal
effects as the law of the land. This is the only worth-while restraint
on presidential power suggested by the proposed amendments which
would not seem to involve a serious risk of hampering the conduct of
our foreign relations.
64 S.J.

Res. 1, §§3 and 4, supra note 1, and S.J. Res. 43, §1, supra note 2.
of the Secretary of State before the Senate Judiciary Committee, supra
note 17, at 6.
66 See supra note 54.
67 U.S. CoNST., art. II, §2, cl. 2.
65 Statement
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III. Conclusions
It is often said that our Constitution by its system of legal checks on
the discretionary powers given to our officials ensures a government of
law and not of men. The power to conduct our foreign affairs is
unusual because of the absence of any express limitations on presidential discretion. Few would object to constitutional limitations which
would prevent abuse of that discretion without eliminating the discretion itself. But the very subject matter of the power bespeaks the difficulty of saying what those limitations shall be, for our foreign relations
are essentially a matter of domestic and international politics. It is true
that the effects of international agreements are often legal as well as
political and that where there is the power to make law there should
also be legal limitations on that power, but in the past the most effective
checks on presidential abuse of discretion in this field have been political, not legal. Enough has been said about the indirect political controls
of Congress. To them must be added the power of public opinion and
of the ballot box. These have proved reasonably effective in the past,
and it is submitted that even if the proposed amendments were adopted,
the political checks and not the amendments would prove to be the only
effective limitations on presidential discretion. Our present system has
served us well up to now. A step as serious as constitutional amendment
should not be undertaken on the mere speculation that abuses will
occur. The proponents of the amendments without doubt have good
cause to feel that political pressure is too slow and that to wait until
abuses occur is to advocate locking the barn after the horse has been
stolen. In this they would be unanswerable were it not for the fact that
the amendments they propose cannot achieve the limitations they desire
without seriously crippling our ability to conduct ourselves in foreign
affairs as a sovereign nation and as the leader of the free world.

John F. Spindler, S.Ed.

